Latest revenue
$193.3M
as of 2026-05-02
Latest net income
$-13.3M
as of 2026-05-02
Net margin
-6.9%
as of 2026-05-02
Community sentiment
Where do you think ZUMZ is heading?
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ZUMZ vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Background shading marks the US business-cycle phase at each point in time — early, mid and late expansion, then recession— so you can see which economic backdrop each move happened in. Recessions are NBER-official; expansion sub-phases are ActaClear's editorial dating.
Live market
as of Jun 29, 2026- Market cap
- $297.0M
- Enterprise value
- $235.7M
- P/E (trailing)
- 22.2×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 0.97×
- Dividend yield
- 0.0%
- 52-wk high
- $31.70
- 52-wk low
- $12.78
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 16.9M
What this company does
Item 1. BUSINESS Zumiez Inc., including its wholly-owned subsidiaries, is a leading specialty retailer of apparel, footwear, accessories and hardgoods for young men and women who want to express their individuality through the fashion, music, art and culture of action sports, streetwear and other unique lifestyles. Zumiez Inc. was formed in August 1978 and is a Washington State corporation. We operate under the names Zumiez, Blue Tomato and Fast Times. We operate ecommerce websites at zumiez.com, zumiez.ca, blue-tomato.com and fasttimes.com.au. At January 31, 2026, we operated 719 stores; 561 in the United States (“U.S.”), 45 in Canada, 85 in Europe and 28 in Australia. We acquired Blue…
AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt
Generated from ZUMZ's filing dated 2026-03-12
Key risks
1A. Risk Factors Investing in our securities involves a high degree of risk. The following risk factors, issues and uncertainties should be considered in evaluating our future prospects. In particular, keep these risk factors in mind when you read “forward-looking” statements elsewhere in this report. Forward-looking statements relate to our expectations for future events and time periods. Generally, the words “anticipates,” “expects,” “intends,” “may,” “should,” “plans,” “believes,” “predicts,” “potential,” “continue” and similar expressions identify forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties, and future events and circumstances could differ…
AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt
Generated from ZUMZ's filing dated 2026-03-12
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Retail-Apparel & Accessory Stores (9 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 30, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does ZUMZ's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.