Real Estate Investment Trusts · SIC 6798

OUTFRONT Media Inc.

OUT

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Latest revenue

$429.6M

as of 2026-03-31

Latest net income

$19.1M

as of 2026-03-31

Net margin

4.4%

as of 2026-03-31

Community sentiment

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OUT vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100

+4.8% / yr 5.3 pts / yr vs S&P 500(S&P 500 +10.2% / yr) 77.5% total
Compare:
Early cycleMid cycleLate cycleRecession

Background shading marks the US business-cycle phase at each point in time — early, mid and late expansion, then recession— so you can see which economic backdrop each move happened in. Recessions are NBER-official; expansion sub-phases are ActaClear's editorial dating.

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Live market

as of Jun 21, 2026
$31.22
0.29%
Market cap
$5.50B
Enterprise value
$8.01B
P/E (trailing)
37.4×
Forward P/E
P/B
8.30×
Dividend yield
3.8%
52-wk high
$34.96
52-wk low
$15.45
Beta
Shares out
176.1M

What this company does

AI

Item 1. Business. Overview OUTFRONT Media is a real estate investment trust (“REIT”), which provides advertising space (“displays”) on out-of-home advertising structures and sites in the United States (the “U.S.”) and Canada. We are one of the largest providers of advertising space on out-of-home advertising structures and sites across the U.S. and Canada. Our inventory consists of billboard displays, which are primarily located on the most heavily traveled highways and roadways in top Nielsen Designated Market Areas (“DMAs”), and transit advertising displays operated under exclusive multi-year contracts with municipalities in large cities across the U.S. and Canada. In total, we have…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from OUT's filing dated 2024-02-22

Key risks

AI

Item 1A. Risk Factors. You should carefully consider the following risks, together with all of the other information in this Annual Report on Form 10-K, including “Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” and our consolidated financial statements and the notes thereto in “Item 8. Financial Statements and Supplementary Data,” before investing in the Company. The occurrence of any of the following risks might cause you to lose all or a part of your investment. Certain statements in the following risk factors constitute forward-looking statements. See “Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements.” Risks Related to Our Business…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from OUT's filing dated 2024-02-22

6.0
of 10

ActaClear Score

Above avg
#165 of 287 in Real Estate Investment Trusts
+0.3 · 25d
Profitability·25%
7.4
Growth·15%
5.5
Value·20%
5.3
Quality·20%
3.7
Momentum·20%
7.8

Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Real Estate Investment Trusts (287 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 30, 2026.

3.37
Price / FV

Fair value · DCF

Deeply overvalued
~70% downside at this growth
8.2% / yr
-5%30%
Terminal growthWACC 8.2% · 10y forecast
Market-implied growth at today's price: 16.8% / yrfor 10 years, holding WACC 8.2% and terminal 2.5%.
Current price
$31.22
DCF fair value
$9.26
FCF base (last FY)
$147.00M
Net debt
$2.48B
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)

Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.

Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:

  • Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
  • Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
  • WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
  • No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
  • Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
  • Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.

Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.

Historical multiples

How does OUT's current valuation compare to its own past?

Current P/E
37.4×
Own 5y average
25.0×
Own 5y median
27.7×
vs. own average
+50%
Industry 5y avg P/E
30.6×
Median P/E across the top 40 peers in Real Estate Investment Trusts by market cap, then averaged across 5 years.
vs. industry
+22%
PEG (this co.)
4.57
5y revenue CAGR
8.2%
Industry PEG
4.18
Industry 5y avg growth
7.3%
Current P/B
8.30×
Own 5y avg P/B
3.70×
Industry 5y avg P/B
2.48×
vs. industry P/B
+235%
P/B shown for REIT names because P/E gets distorted by credit-cycle losses, non-cash depreciation, and reserve movements. Book equity is a more stable franchise-value signal here.
Solid: this company. Dotted: industry median.
Dashed flat: own 5y avg.
Coloured dot at right: current P/E.

P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.