Latest revenue
$51.0M
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$8.7M
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
17.1%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think LB is heading?
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LB vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Background shading marks the US business-cycle phase at each point in time — early, mid and late expansion, then recession— so you can see which economic backdrop each move happened in. Recessions are NBER-official; expansion sub-phases are ActaClear's editorial dating.
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $1.51B
- Enterprise value
- $2.02B
- P/E (trailing)
- 50.2×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 4.39×
- Dividend yield
- 0.7%
- 52-wk high
- $85.60
- 52-wk low
- $43.75
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 23.3M
What this company does
LandBridge owns or manages over 315,000 surface acres in the Delaware Basin's Permian region, leasing the land to oil, gas, infrastructure, and digital customers. It earns money through surface-use royalties and fees, resource sales (brackish water, caliche, sand), and oil and gas mineral royalties, with customers covering nearly all capital costs. Revenue nearly doubled to $199 million in 2025, driven by deepening ties with affiliated water-midstream operator WaterBridge and expansion into data centers and power infrastructure on its acreage.
Generated from LB's filing dated 2026-02-26
Key risks
- Customer concentration: WaterBridge (sister company sharing sponsor Five Point and management) drives produced water royalties, creating related-party dependency and conflict-of-interest exposure.
- Commodity exposure: revenues tied to Delaware Basin oil/gas activity; any Permian slowdown directly hits surface royalties, resource sales, and 4,400-acre mineral royalties.
- Heavy share-based compensation: $45.3M in 2025 and $95.3M in 2024 dilutes shareholders and distorts GAAP earnings versus Free Cash Flow narrative.
Generated from LB's filing dated 2026-02-26
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Oil Royalty Traders (10 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 29, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does LB's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.