Services-Personal Services · SIC 7200

YELP INC

YELP

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Latest revenue

$361.5M

as of 2026-03-31

Latest net income

$17.7M

as of 2026-03-31

Net margin

4.9%

as of 2026-03-31

Community sentiment

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YELP vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100

-5.0% / yr 24.7 pts / yr vs S&P 500(S&P 500 +19.7% / yr) 18.3% total
Compare:

Live market

delayed ≤15 min
$23.73
3.35%
Market cap
$1.66B
Enterprise value
$1.68B
P/E (trailing)
11.4×
Forward P/E
P/B
2.62×
Dividend yield
0.0%
52-wk high
$37.55
52-wk low
$19.60
Beta
Shares out
69.8M

What this company does

AI

Item 1. Business. Company Overview Since Yelp’s founding nearly 20 years ago, our mission has remained the same — to connect consumers with great local businesses. Over that time, we have built one of the best-known Internet brands in the United States. Consumers trust us for the more than 260 million ratings and reviews available on our platform of businesses across a broad range of categories. This consumer trust is the foundation of our business, from which we are able to empower other businesses to succeed. Our advertising products help businesses of all sizes reach a large audience, advertise their products and drive conversion of their services. Our performance in 2023 — which…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from YELP's filing dated 2024-02-27

Key risks

AI

Table of Contents Item 1A. Risk Factors Risks Related to Our Business and Industry Adverse macroeconomic conditions — such as the current uncertain economic environment — have had, and may continue to have, a significant adverse impact on our business and results of operations, and also exposes our business to other risks. The United States continues to face widespread macroeconomic uncertainties, including labor disruptions, inflation and recessionary concerns. These challenging macroeconomic conditions have had, and may continue to have, a significant adverse impact on our business and results of operations. For example, adverse macroeconomic conditions have had, and may continue to have,…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from YELP's filing dated 2024-02-27

6.5
of 10

ActaClear Score

Above avg
#7 of 18 in Services-Personal Services
+0.3 · 5d
Profitability·25%
7.9
Growth·15%
7.6
Value·20%
5.7
Quality·20%
Momentum·20%
4.7

Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Services-Personal Services (18 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.

0.40
Price / FV

Fair value · DCF

Deeply undervalued
~147% upside at this growth
10.9% / yr
-5%30%
Terminal growthWACC 9.8% · 10y forecast
Market-implied growth at today's price: -2.7% / yrfor 10 years, holding WACC 9.8% and terminal 2.5%.
Current price
$23.26
DCF fair value
$57.50
FCF base (last FY)
$145.60M
Net debt
$-216.06M
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)

Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.

Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:

  • Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
  • Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
  • WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
  • No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
  • Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
  • Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.

Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.

Historical multiples

How does YELP's current valuation compare to its own past?

Current P/E
11.4×
Own 5y average
30.2×
Own 5y median
26.9×
vs. own average
-62%
Industry 5y avg P/E
23.1×
Median P/E across the top 17 peers in Services-Personal Services by market cap, then averaged across 6 years.
vs. industry
-51%
PEG (this co.)
1.04
5y revenue CAGR
10.9%
Industry PEG
2.72
Industry 5y avg growth
8.5%
Solid: this company. Dotted: industry median.
Dashed flat: own 5y avg.
Coloured dot at right: current P/E.

P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.