Latest revenue
$3.34B
as of 2026-04-03
Latest net income
$3.21B
as of 2026-04-03
Net margin
96.0%
as of 2026-04-03
Community sentiment
Where do you think WDC is heading?
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WDC vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $178.45B
- Enterprise value
- $177.98B
- P/E (trailing)
- 94.5×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 18.43×
- Dividend yield
- 0.1%
- 52-wk high
- $602.54
- 52-wk low
- $54.60
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 344.7M
What this company does
Western Digital makes hard disk drives (HDDs) — the high-capacity spinning storage that cloud data centers, enterprises, and PCs use to hold massive volumes of data. It earns nearly 90% of revenue selling high-capacity drives to cloud and hyperscale customers, with the rest split between PC OEMs and consumer retail. After spinning off its Sandisk flash business in February 2025, Western Digital now operates as a pure-play HDD vendor riding an AI-driven surge in cloud storage demand, with revenue up 45% year-over-year and gross margins expanding to 50%.
Generated from WDC's filing dated 2025-08-14
Key risks
- Cloud concentration: 89% of revenue depends on hyperscaler demand, leaving WDC highly exposed to AI capex slowdowns or hyperscaler order cuts.
- Sandisk-linked volatility: $2.73B Q3 gain on retained Sandisk stake plus $545M debt-for-equity exchange costs make earnings non-recurring and hard to model.
- Tariff/trade exposure: management flags U.S. trade policy uncertainty and retaliation risk; Asia shipments grew to $1.32B (40% of Q3 revenue).
Generated from WDC's filing dated 2025-08-14
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Computer Storage Devices (6 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does WDC's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.