Services-Educational Services · SIC 8200

Strategic Education, Inc.

STRA

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Latest revenue

$305.9M

as of 2026-03-31

Latest net income

$32.8M

as of 2026-03-31

Net margin

10.7%

as of 2026-03-31

Community sentiment

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STRA vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100

+7.9% / yr 11.8 pts / yr vs S&P 500(S&P 500 +19.7% / yr) 35.2% total
Compare:

Live market

delayed ≤15 min
$80.57
0.33%
Market cap
$1.82B
Enterprise value
$1.67B
P/E (trailing)
14.4×
Forward P/E
P/B
1.11×
Dividend yield
3.0%
52-wk high
$88.50
52-wk low
$69.70
Beta
Shares out
22.6M

What this company does

AI

Table of Contents Item 1. Business Overview Strategic Education, Inc. (“SEI,” “we,” “us,” “our,” or “the Company”) is an education services company that provides access to high-quality education through campus-based and online post-secondary education offerings, as well as through programs to develop job-ready skills for high-demand markets. We operate primarily through our wholly-owned subsidiaries, Capella University and Strayer University, both accredited post-secondary institutions of higher education located in the United States, and Torrens University, an accredited post-secondary institution of higher education located in Australia. Our operations also include the Education…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from STRA's filing dated 2026-02-27

Key risks

AI

Item 1A. Risk Factors Investing in our common stock involves a high degree of risk. You should carefully consider the following risk factors and all other information contained in this Annual Report on Form 10-K or in the documents incorporated by reference herein before making an investment decision. The occurrence of any of the following risks could materially harm our business, adversely affect the market price of our common stock and could cause you to suffer a partial or complete loss of your investment. Additional risks not presently known to us or that we currently deem immaterial may also materially harm our business and operations. See “Cautionary Notice Regarding Forward-Looking…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from STRA's filing dated 2026-02-27

6.4
of 10

ActaClear Score

Above avg
#9 of 28 in Services-Educational Services
+0.2 · 5d
Profitability·25%
6.1
Growth·15%
4.1
Value·20%
9.1
Quality·20%
Momentum·20%
5.6

Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Services-Educational Services (28 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.

0.84
Price / FV

Fair value · DCF

Undervalued
~19% upside at this growth
4.3% / yr
-5%30%
Terminal growthWACC 9.8% · 10y forecast
Market-implied growth at today's price: 1.8% / yrfor 10 years, holding WACC 9.8% and terminal 2.5%.
Current price
$80.87
DCF fair value
$95.92
FCF base (last FY)
$126.61M
Net debt
$-140.76M
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)

Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.

Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:

  • Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
  • Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
  • WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
  • No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
  • Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
  • Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.

Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.

Historical multiples

How does STRA's current valuation compare to its own past?

Current P/E
14.4×
Own 5y average
25.2×
Own 5y median
24.3×
vs. own average
-43%
Industry 5y avg P/E
17.3×
Median P/E across the top 25 peers in Services-Educational Services by market cap, then averaged across 5 years.
vs. industry
-17%
PEG (this co.)
3.35
5y revenue CAGR
4.3%
Industry PEG
1.81
Industry 5y avg growth
9.5%
Solid: this company. Dotted: industry median.
Dashed flat: own 5y avg.
Coloured dot at right: current P/E.

P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.