Apparel & Other Finishd Prods of Fabrics & Similar Matl · SIC 2300
SUPERIOR GROUP OF COMPANIES, INC.
SGC
Latest revenue
$140.9M
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$834.0K
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
0.6%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
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SGC vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $204.0M
- Enterprise value
- $268.2M
- P/E (trailing)
- 29.1×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 1.06×
- Dividend yield
- 4.3%
- 52-wk high
- $13.78
- 52-wk low
- $8.30
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 15.6M
What this company does
Item 1. Business Overview Superior Group of Companies, Inc. (together with its subsidiaries, “the Company,” “Superior,” “we,” “our,” or “us”) was organized in 1920 and was incorporated in 1922 as a New York company under the name Superior Surgical Mfg. Co., Inc. In 1998, Superior Surgical Mfg. Co. changed its name to Superior Uniform Group, Inc. and redomiciled to Florida. Effective on May 3, 2018, Superior Uniform Group, Inc. changed its name to Superior Group of Companies, Inc. Superior is comprised of three reportable business segments: (1) Branded Products, (2) Healthcare Apparel, and (3) Contact Centers. Superior’s Branded Products segment, primarily through its signature marketing…
AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt
Generated from SGC's filing dated 2026-03-03
Key risks
Item 1A. Risk Factors Our business, operations and financial condition are subject to various risks, and many of those risks are driven by factors that we cannot control or predict. The following discussion addresses those risks that management believes are the most significant. You should take these risks into account in evaluating or making any investment decision involving the Company. Additional risks and uncertainties not presently known or that we currently believe to be less significant may also adversely affect us. Risks Relating to Our Business and Operations Shortages of sourced goods or raw materials from suppliers, interruptions in our manufacturing, and local conditions in the…
AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt
Generated from SGC's filing dated 2026-03-03
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Apparel & Other Finishd Prods of Fabrics & Similar Matl (12 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does SGC's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.