Life Insurance · SIC 6311

REINSURANCE GROUP OF AMERICA INC

RZC

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Latest revenue

$1.70B

as of 2026-03-31

Latest net income

$330.0M

as of 2026-03-31

Net margin

19.4%

as of 2026-03-31

Community sentiment

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RZC vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100

+0.2% / yr 19.5 pts / yr vs S&P 500(S&P 500 +19.7% / yr) 0.6% total
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Market data

Price feed temporarily unavailable for RZC.

What this company does

AI

Table of Contents Item 1. BUSINESS Overview Reinsurance Group of America, Incorporated (“RGA”) is an insurance holding company that was formed on December 31, 1992. The consolidated financial statements herein include the assets, liabilities, and results of operations of RGA and its subsidiaries, all of which are wholly owned. The terms “Company”, “we”, “us” and “our” in this Annual Report on Form 10-K refer to RGA and its subsidiaries. The Company is a leading global provider of traditional life and health, and asset-intensive reinsurance, with operations in the U.S., Latin America, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Asia and Australia. Reinsurance is an arrangement under which an…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from RZC's filing dated 2026-02-20

Key risks

AI

Table of Contents Item 1A. RISK FACTORS In the Risk Factors below, we refer to the Company as “we,” “us,” or “our.” Investing in our securities involves certain risks. Any of the following risks could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. These risks are not exclusive, and additional risks to which we are subject include, but are not limited to, the factors mentioned under “Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements” in Item 7 below and the risks of our business described elsewhere in this Annual Report on Form 10-K. Many of these risks are interrelated and occur under similar business and economic conditions, and the occurrence of…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from RZC's filing dated 2026-02-20

6.3
of 10

ActaClear Score

Above avg
#9 of 32 in Life Insurance
+0.0 · 5d
Profitability·25%
4.0
Growth·15%
8.7
Value·20%
8.8
Quality·20%
6.8
Momentum·20%
4.2

Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Life Insurance (32 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.

0.03
Price / FV

Fair value · DCF

Deeply undervalued
~3650% upside at this growth
10.2% / yr
-5%30%
Terminal growthWACC 5.9% · 10y forecast
Current price
$25.43
DCF fair value
$953
FCF base (last FY)
$1.18B
Net debt
$5.40B
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)

Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.

Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:

  • Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
  • Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
  • WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
  • No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
  • Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
  • Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.

Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.

Historical multiples

How does RZC's current valuation compare to its own past?

Current P/E
1.4×
Own 5y average
2.1×
Own 5y median
2.2×
vs. own average
-33%
Industry 5y avg P/E
6.3×
Median P/E across the top 28 peers in Life Insurance by market cap, then averaged across 5 years.
vs. industry
-78%
PEG (this co.)
0.14
5y revenue CAGR
10.2%
Industry PEG
1.59
Industry 5y avg growth
4.0%
Current P/B
0.13×
Own 5y avg P/B
0.22×
Industry 5y avg P/B
0.63×
vs. industry P/B
-80%
P/B shown for insurer names because P/E gets distorted by credit-cycle losses, non-cash depreciation, and reserve movements. Book equity is a more stable franchise-value signal here.
Solid: this company. Dotted: industry median.
Dashed flat: own 5y avg.
Coloured dot at right: current P/E.

P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.