Latest revenue
$13.4M
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$1.4M
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
10.1%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think PROV is heading?
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PROV vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Background shading marks the US business-cycle phase at each point in time — early, mid and late expansion, then recession— so you can see which economic backdrop each move happened in. Recessions are NBER-official; expansion sub-phases are ActaClear's editorial dating.
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $107.8M
- Enterprise value
- $50.7M
- P/E (trailing)
- 17.2×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 0.85×
- Dividend yield
- 3.2%
- 52-wk high
- $17.42
- 52-wk low
- $14.95
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 6.3M
What this company does
Item 1. Business General Provident Financial Holdings, Inc. (the “Corporation”), a Delaware corporation, was organized in January 1996 for the purpose of becoming the holding company of Provident Savings Bank, F.S.B. (the “Bank”) upon the Bank’s conversion from a federal mutual to a federal stock savings bank (“Conversion”). The Conversion was completed on June 27, 1996. The Corporation is regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”). At June 30, 2025, the Corporation had consolidated total assets of $1.25 billion, total deposits of $888.8 million and stockholders’ equity of $128.5 million. The Corporation has not engaged in any significant activity…
AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt
Generated from PROV's filing dated 2025-08-29
Key risks
Item 1A. Risk Factors We assume and manage a certain degree of risk in order to conduct our business. In addition to the risk factors described below, other risks and uncertainties not specifically mentioned, or that are currently known to, or deemed by, management to be immaterial may also materially and adversely affect our financial position, results of operation and/or cash flows. Before making an investment decision, you should carefully consider the risks described below together with all of the other information included in this Form 10-K. If any of the circumstances described in the following risk factors actually occur, the value of our common stock could decline and you could…
AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt
Generated from PROV's filing dated 2025-08-29
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Savings Institution, Federally Chartered (47 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 26, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does PROV's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.