Latest revenue
$1.05B
as of 2026-05-03
Latest net income
$24.1M
as of 2026-05-03
Net margin
2.3%
as of 2026-05-03
Community sentiment
Where do you think P is heading?
Keep private notes on P — thesis, target price, catalysts to watch.
Visible only to you. Never shared. Never used to train AI.
P vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $23.27B
- Enterprise value
- $22.43B
- P/E (trailing)
- 123.6×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 16.13×
- Dividend yield
- 0.0%
- 52-wk high
- $93.92
- 52-wk low
- $66.24
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 332.4M
What this company does
Everpure (formerly Pure Storage) builds all-flash enterprise storage hardware and software that unifies data management across on-premises, cloud, and edge environments. It earns revenue from selling flash storage systems and from subscription services like Evergreen//One, which delivers storage-as-a-service with outcome-based SLAs. The company is pivoting from a flash storage vendor toward an AI-era 'Enterprise Data Cloud' platform, anchored by a landmark hyperscaler design win now shipping in volume.
Generated from P's filing dated 2026-03-25
Key risks
- Hyperscaler concentration: a single major hyperscaler design win drives outsized fiscal 2026/2027 shipments, creating revenue concentration if orders slow.
- Evergreen//One subscription model leaves Everpure on the hook for hardware upgrades and SLA outcomes, pressuring margins if NAND/QLC costs rise.
- Execution risk on AI/EDC pivot: success depends on adoption of Fusion, Portworx and Enterprise Data Cloud against entrenched hyperscaler and SSD competitors.
Generated from P's filing dated 2026-03-25
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Computer Storage Devices (6 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.