Latest revenue
$2.19B
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$89.0M
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
4.1%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think NWSA is heading?
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NWSA vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $15.75B
- Enterprise value
- $15.57B
- P/E (trailing)
- 13.3×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 1.83×
- Dividend yield
- 0.7%
- 52-wk high
- $31.61
- 52-wk low
- $22.20
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 579.0M
What this company does
News Corp operates a diversified media empire spanning newspapers (Wall Street Journal, The Times, New York Post), Dow Jones financial information, HarperCollins book publishing, and digital real estate listings via REA Group and Realtor.com. Subscriptions and circulation generate the largest revenue slice at $1.57 billion for the half-year, followed by consumer (book) sales, real estate listings, and advertising. Following last year's sale of Foxtel, the company now leans on subscription-based information services and digital real estate for growth, returning cash through $264 million in buybacks this half.
Generated from NWSA's filing dated 2025-08-06
Key risks
- Earnings deterioration: Q2 net income from continuing operations fell 21% to $242M; diluted EPS dropped to $0.34 from $0.40 year-over-year.
- Cash burn: cash declined $352M to $2.05B in six months as $264M buybacks, $104M dividends and $180M capex outpaced $316M operating cash flow.
- Dual-class control: Murdoch family's Class B supervoting structure (185.9M shares) limits Class A shareholder influence over capital allocation and strategic decisions.
Generated from NWSA's filing dated 2025-08-06
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Newspapers: Publishing or Publishing & Printing (7 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does NWSA's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.