Latest revenue
$1.71B
as of 2026-01-23
Latest net income
$334.0M
as of 2026-01-23
Net margin
19.5%
as of 2026-01-23
Community sentiment
Where do you think NTAP is heading?
Keep private notes on NTAP — thesis, target price, catalysts to watch.
Visible only to you. Never shared. Never used to train AI.
NTAP vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $32.27B
- Enterprise value
- $33.13B
- P/E (trailing)
- 27.2×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 27.87×
- Dividend yield
- 1.6%
- 52-wk high
- $192.83
- 52-wk low
- $93.69
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 195.9M
What this company does
NetApp sells enterprise data storage hardware, software, and cloud services that help large organizations store, manage, and protect their data across on-premises systems and public clouds. Services revenue (support contracts and cloud subscriptions) now slightly exceeds product sales, generating $927M versus $786M in the latest quarter, with total nine-month revenue of $4.98B up 3% year-over-year. The company is leaning hard into shareholder returns, paying down $750M in debt while spending $750M on buybacks and $310M on dividends over nine months as operating cash flow jumped 34% to $1.12B.
Generated from NTAP's filing dated 2025-06-09
Key risks
- Thin equity cushion: stockholders' equity just $1.16B against $9.97B assets and $2.49B long-term debt, leaving little buffer if demand softens.
- Cash burn from capital returns: nine-month outflows included $750M buybacks, $750M debt repayment and $310M dividends, dropping cash from $2.74B to $1.63B.
- Modest top-line growth: Q3 revenue up only 4.4% YoY ($1.71B vs $1.64B); product gross margin compressed as product COGS rose 7% on 3.7% product revenue growth.
Generated from NTAP's filing dated 2025-06-09
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Computer Storage Devices (6 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does NTAP's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.