Latest revenue
$9.88B
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$875.0M
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
8.9%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think NOC is heading?
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NOC vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $77.75B
- Enterprise value
- $90.08B
- P/E (trailing)
- 18.6×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 4.54×
- Dividend yield
- 1.7%
- 52-wk high
- $774.00
- 52-wk low
- $472.02
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 142.0M
What this company does
Northrop Grumman builds advanced military hardware and systems, including aircraft, missiles, space platforms, and defense electronics, primarily for the U.S. government. The company earns nearly all its revenue from long-term defense contracts, with product sales (about $8 billion quarterly) dominating over services. The B-21 stealth bomber program remains a major drag, carrying a $1 billion remaining loss accrual after a $477 million charge in early 2025, though Q1 2026 operating income jumped 73% as that hit didn't recur.
Generated from NOC's filing dated 2026-01-27
Key risks
- B-21 program carries a remaining $1.0B loss accrual after a fresh $477M Q1 2025 LRIP charge; further cost overruns possible.
- Operating cash flow remains deeply negative at -$1.66B in Q1 2026, driven by $551M unbilled receivables build and working capital outflows.
- Leverage elevated: $14.4B long-term debt plus $498M commercial paper draw against only $2.09B cash; dividend raised to $2.31/share.
Generated from NOC's filing dated 2026-01-27
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical Sys (11 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does NOC's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.