Latest revenue
$3.10B
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$149.0M
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
4.8%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think HII is heading?
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HII vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $11.71B
- Enterprise value
- $15.00B
- P/E (trailing)
- 19.4×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- —
- Dividend yield
- 1.8%
- 52-wk high
- $459.97
- 52-wk low
- $215.05
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 39.4M
What this company does
Huntington Ingalls Industries builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious warships for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, and provides defense technology services through its Mission Technologies arm. Revenue comes almost entirely from long-term U.S. government shipbuilding contracts, with product sales (ships) generating roughly two-thirds of the $9 billion nine-month top line. As America's largest military shipbuilder, HII is ramping production with operating income up 14% year-to-date and capex rising, while drawing down cash to repay $500 million of debt and fund a $132 million acquisition.
Generated from HII's filing dated 2026-02-05
Key risks
- Customer concentration: nearly all revenue derives from U.S. Navy/government shipbuilding contracts, exposing HII to defense budget and program timing risk.
- Liquidity tightening: cash fell to $312M from $831M YTD; long-term debt $2.7B and contract assets grew to $1.87B, straining working capital.
- Fixed-price shipbuilding execution risk: contract assets up $186M and inventoried costs rising signal potential cost overruns on long-cycle Navy programs.
Generated from HII's filing dated 2026-02-05
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Ship & Boat Building & Repairing (7 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does HII's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.