Latest revenue
$1.15B
as of 2026-03-22
Latest net income
$139.8M
as of 2026-03-22
Net margin
12.2%
as of 2026-03-22
Community sentiment
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DPZ vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Market data
Price feed temporarily unavailable for DPZ.
What this company does
Domino's Pizza runs the world's largest pizza delivery and carryout chain, operating through a heavily franchised model with roughly 21,000 stores across the U.S. and international markets. The company makes most of its money by selling food, equipment, and supplies to franchisees through its supply chain segment (about 60% of revenue), supplemented by U.S. and international franchise royalties plus a small base of company-owned stores. Revenue grew 6% year-over-year to $3.26 billion through three quarters with net income up 15% to $415 million, while the company carries roughly $5 billion in long-term debt and a $4 billion stockholders' deficit driven by years of recapitalizations and buybacks.
Generated from DPZ's filing dated 2026-02-23
Key risks
- Highly leveraged: $4.97B long-term debt against $3.98B stockholders' deficit; interest expense $135M YTD consumes ~22% of operating income.
- Franchise/supply-chain dependent model: supply chain ($1.97B) and franchise royalties drive revenue; any franchisee health deterioration directly hits results.
- DPC Dash (China) equity exposure of $162M; $18.9M unrealized gain YTD makes earnings sensitive to Chinese market sentiment.
Generated from DPZ's filing dated 2026-02-23
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Wholesale-Groceries & Related Products (7 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does DPZ's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.