Latest revenue
$1.64B
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$179.3M
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
11.0%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think DLR is heading?
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DLR vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $64.98B
- Enterprise value
- $63.69B
- P/E (trailing)
- 49.7×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 2.78×
- Dividend yield
- 3.3%
- 52-wk high
- $208.14
- 52-wk low
- $146.23
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 351.4M
What this company does
Digital Realty Trust owns, develops, and operates data centers, leasing space and power to technology, cloud, and enterprise customers across 223 facilities globally. The company generates revenue primarily through long-term rental agreements on its 36 million square feet of data center space, structured as a REIT that distributes income to shareholders. Digital Realty is integrating its pending InterXion combination to expand European colocation and interconnection capabilities, building on prior DuPont Fabros and Ascenty acquisitions.
Generated from DLR's filing dated 2026-02-13
Key risks
- Pending InterXion combination: integration failure, unrealized synergies, or deal-related liabilities could disrupt operations and weigh on returns.
- Heavy development pipeline exposure: 3.1M sq ft under construction plus 2.3M sq ft held for development risks lease-up shortfalls and cost overruns.
- Capital-structure dependence: REIT model relies on external debt/equity; rising rates, FX swings, or credit downgrades could pressure refinancing and covenants.
Generated from DLR's filing dated 2026-02-13
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Real Estate Investment Trusts (287 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does DLR's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.