Latest revenue
$1.95B
as of 2026-03-31
Latest net income
$466.0M
as of 2026-03-31
Net margin
23.9%
as of 2026-03-31
Community sentiment
Where do you think CTRA is heading?
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CTRA vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $162.37B
- Enterprise value
- $165.39B
- P/E (trailing)
- 94.6×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 10.75×
- Dividend yield
- 0.3%
- 52-wk high
- $720.00
- 52-wk low
- $22.33
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 759.4M
What this company does
Coterra Energy is an oil and gas producer drilling wells in U.S. shale basins, primarily the Permian (Delaware Basin), Marcellus, and Anadarko. It earns revenue mainly from selling crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids, with oil contributing roughly half of its $5.7 billion nine-month top line. The company is digesting a $2.5 billion January 2025 acquisition of Franklin Mountain Energy, which expanded its Delaware Basin footprint and drained its cash balance from $2.0 billion to under $100 million.
Generated from CTRA's filing dated 2024-02-23
Key risks
- Liquidity drawdown: cash fell from $2.04B to $98M after $3.24B spent on acquisitions; current liabilities ($1.49B) now exceed current assets ($1.53B) marginally.
- Integration/concentration: $2.5B FME and additional Delaware Basin deals add ~$3.24B of acquisition spend, concentrating exposure to Permian execution and commodity prices.
- Rising leverage and interest burden: long-term debt $3.92B with $250M current portion; interest expense doubled YoY to $156M for nine months.
Generated from CTRA's filing dated 2024-02-23
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas (96 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.
Historical multiples
How does CTRA's current valuation compare to its own past?
P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.