Railroads, Line-Haul Operating · SIC 4011

CANADIAN PACIFIC KANSAS CITY LTD/CN

CP

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Latest revenue

$3.70B

as of 2026-03-31

Latest net income

$846.0M

as of 2026-03-31

Net margin

22.9%

as of 2026-03-31

Community sentiment

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CP vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100

+7.5% / yr 12.2 pts / yr vs S&P 500(S&P 500 +19.7% / yr) 33.3% total
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Market data

Price feed temporarily unavailable for CP.

What this company does

AI

CPKC 2025 ANNUAL REPORT / 3 ITEM 1. BUSINESS Company Overview Canadian Pacific Kansas City Limited ("CPKC" or the "Company") owns and operates the only freight railway spanning Canada, the United States ("U.S."), and Mexico. CPKC provides rail and intermodal transportation services over a network of approximately 20,000 miles, serving principal business centres across Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. CPKC transports bulk commodities, merchandise freight, and intermodal traffic. For additional information regarding CPKC's network and geographical locations, refer to Item 2. Properties. The Company was originally incorporated on June 22, 2001, under the Canada Business Corporations Act and…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from CP's filing dated 2026-02-26

Key risks

AI

16 / CPKC 2025 ANNUAL REPORT ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS The risks set forth in the following risk factors could have a materially adverse effect on the Company's business, financial condition, results of operations, and liquidity, and could cause those results to differ materially from those expressed or implied in the Company's forward-looking statements and forward-looking information (collectively, "forward-looking statements"). The information set forth in this Item 1A. Risk Factors should be read in conjunction with the rest of the information included in this Annual Report on Form 10-K, including Part II Item 7. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from CP's filing dated 2026-02-26

7.5
of 10

ActaClear Score

Above avg
#1 of 5 in Railroads, Line-Haul Operating
+0.0 · 5d
Profitability·25%
6.3
Growth·15%
7.5
Value·20%
6.7
Quality·20%
10.0
Momentum·20%
7.5

Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Railroads, Line-Haul Operating (5 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.

0.54
Price / FV

Fair value · DCF

Deeply undervalued
~84% upside at this growth
14.4% / yr
-5%30%
Terminal growthWACC 8.8% · 10y forecast
Market-implied growth at today's price: 7.6% / yrfor 10 years, holding WACC 8.8% and terminal 2.5%.
Current price
$89.93
DCF fair value
$165
FCF base (last FY)
$4.14B
Net debt
$19.76B
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)

Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.

Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:

  • Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
  • Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
  • WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
  • No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
  • Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
  • Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.

Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.

Historical multiples

How does CP's current valuation compare to its own past?

Current P/E
19.3×
Own 5y average
17.5×
Own 5y median
17.6×
vs. own average
+10%
Industry 5y avg P/E
20.3×
Median P/E across the top 5 peers in Railroads, Line-Haul Operating by market cap, then averaged across 5 years.
vs. industry
-5%
PEG (this co.)
1.34
5y revenue CAGR
14.4%
Industry PEG
1.54
Industry 5y avg growth
13.2%
Solid: this company. Dotted: industry median.
Dashed flat: own 5y avg.
Coloured dot at right: current P/E.

P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.