National Commercial Banks · SIC 6021

Bank First Corp

BFC

Watch

Latest revenue

$16.7M

as of 2026-03-31

Latest net income

$20.0M

as of 2026-03-31

Net margin

119.9%

as of 2026-03-31

Community sentiment

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BFC vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100

+14.5% / yr 5.2 pts / yr vs S&P 500(S&P 500 +19.7% / yr) 96.6% total
Compare:

Live market

delayed ≤15 min
$143.55
1.32%
Market cap
$1.60B
Enterprise value
$1.55B
P/E (trailing)
22.4×
Forward P/E
P/B
1.95×
Dividend yield
1.7%
52-wk high
$153.00
52-wk low
$109.11
Beta
Shares out
11.2M

What this company does

AI

ITEM 1. BUSINESS General Overview Bank First Corporation is a Wisconsin corporation that was organized in April 1982 to serve as the holding company for Bank First, N.A., a national banking association founded in 1894. The Bank is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company. The Company and the Bank are headquartered in Manitowoc, Wisconsin, and the Bank is a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the “Federal Reserve”) and regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”). The Bank has thirty-eight (38) offices, including its headquarters, in Brown, Columbia, Dane, Door, Fond du Lac, Green, Jefferson, Manitowoc, Monroe, Outagamie, Ozaukee, Rock,…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from BFC's filing dated 2026-02-27

Key risks

AI

ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS In addition to the other information contained in this Form 10-K, you should carefully consider the risks described below, as well as the risk factors and uncertainties discussed in our other public filings with the SEC under the caption "Risk Factors" in evaluating us and our business and making or continuing an investment in our stock. Our operations and financial results are subject to various risks and uncertainties, including, but not limited, to the material risks described below. Many of these risks are beyond our control although efforts are made to manage those risks while simultaneously optimizing operational and financial results. The occurrence of any of…

AI summary unavailable — showing raw filing excerpt

Generated from BFC's filing dated 2026-02-27

6.3
of 10

ActaClear Score

Above avg
#55 of 134 in National Commercial Banks
-0.2 · 5d
Profitability·25%
7.6
Growth·15%
6.2
Value·20%
4.8
Quality·20%
Momentum·20%
6.2

Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within National Commercial Banks (134 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.

0.60
Price / FV

Fair value · DCF

Deeply undervalued
~67% upside at this growth
14.5% / yr
-5%30%
Terminal growthWACC 9.8% · 10y forecast
Market-implied growth at today's price: 6.8% / yrfor 10 years, holding WACC 9.8% and terminal 2.5%.
Current price
$140
DCF fair value
$235
FCF base (last FY)
$71.50M
Net debt
$-187.86M
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)

Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.

Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:

  • Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
  • Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
  • WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
  • No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
  • Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
  • Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.

Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.

Historical multiples

How does BFC's current valuation compare to its own past?

Current P/E
22.4×
Own 5y average
18.1×
Own 5y median
17.7×
vs. own average
+24%
Industry 5y avg P/E
11.9×
Median P/E across the top 40 peers in National Commercial Banks by market cap, then averaged across 5 years.
vs. industry
+88%
PEG (this co.)
1.55
5y revenue CAGR
14.5%
Industry PEG
0.82
Industry 5y avg growth
14.5%
Current P/B
1.95×
Own 5y avg P/B
2.06×
Industry 5y avg P/B
1.26×
vs. industry P/B
+55%
P/B shown for bank names because P/E gets distorted by credit-cycle losses, non-cash depreciation, and reserve movements. Book equity is a more stable franchise-value signal here.
Solid: this company. Dotted: industry median.
Dashed flat: own 5y avg.
Coloured dot at right: current P/E.

P/E uses year-end weekly close ÷ (net income ÷ shares outstanding today). Held shares constant at today's count, which understates the per-share earnings improvement from buybacks over the period. PEG uses 5y revenue CAGR as a proxy for EPS growth — close, but not identical (margin expansion or dilution can drive a wedge). Best read as a comparator across companies and industries, not as a precise replica of historical multiples.