Latest revenue
$2.2M
as of 2025-06-30
Latest net income
$18.6M
as of 2025-06-30
Net margin
842.0%
as of 2025-06-30
Community sentiment
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ACGP vs S&P 500 · rebased to 100
Live market
delayed ≤15 min- Market cap
- $783.7M
- Enterprise value
- $284.3M
- P/E (trailing)
- 17.7×
- Forward P/E
- —
- P/B
- 0.86×
- Dividend yield
- 0.5%
- 52-wk high
- $41.14
- 52-wk low
- $30.74
- Beta
- —
- Shares out
- 21.1M
What this company does
Associated Capital Group runs merger arbitrage and event-driven hedge funds under the Gabelli brand, while also deploying its own capital into direct private equity stakes. It earns management fees tied to assets under management plus incentive fees based on fund performance, supplemented by returns on its proprietary investment portfolio. Assets under management fell to $1.25 billion at year-end 2024 from $1.59 billion a year earlier, a 22% decline that pressures the core fee-generating business.
Generated from ACGP's filing dated 2025-03-19
Key risks
- AUM declined 22% to $1.25B (from $1.59B), with merger arbitrage—the core strategy—falling $309M to $1.0B, pressuring management fees.
- Key-person and brand dependency: business relies on Mario Gabelli and a revocable 'Gabelli'/'GAMCO' license agreement terminable for quality-control breaches.
- Revenue concentration in merger arbitrage (~80% of AUM) ties earnings to M&A deal flow and antitrust outcomes, with 65% international client exposure.
Generated from ACGP's filing dated 2025-03-19
ActaClear Score
Computed from 5 years of SEC fundamentals + latest market data, ranked within Security Brokers, Dealers & Flotation Companies (42 peers). 10 = best in industry, 5 = median, 0 = worst. Refreshed Jun 10, 2026.
Fair value · DCF
Methodology + caveats (click to expand)
Method. 10-year forecast of free cash flow, discounted at the company's WACC, with a Gordon-growth terminal at year 10. FCF is proxied by last fiscal-year net income (proper FCF needs CFO − CapEx by year, which we don't store yet). Beta defaults to 1.0 when not reported.
Why DCF is fragile. Treat the output as a thinking aid, not a verdict. Honest weaknesses of any DCF:
- Growth is the dominant assumption. No one can foresee 10 years of growth — small changes in the slider can double or halve fair value. The reverse-DCF readout above tells you what the market is implicitly assuming; ask yourself whether that's realistic before trusting either number.
- Terminal value dominates. In most DCFs, 60-80% of the answer comes from the terminal-value calculation — i.e., everything AFTER year 10. A 0.5pp change in terminal growth, or in WACC, can swing fair value by 20-30%.
- WACC is itself a guess. We use a textbook CAPM cost of equity (Rf 4.3%, MRP 5.5%, β from the quote) plus a 6% pretax cost of debt — none of these are the company's actual marginal financing cost.
- No moat / disruption modelling. The model assumes the company keeps earning whatever it earns today, compounding cleanly. Competitive shifts, regulatory action, and technology disruption can invalidate the forecast overnight.
- Net income ≠ free cash flow. For capex-heavy names (semis, telcos) net income overstates distributable cash. For low-capex names (software) it understates. Both reduce the precision of the FV figure.
- Reflexivity. A high stock price often becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy via better hiring, financing, and customer trust. DCF can't see this.
Take the DCF, the reverse-DCF implied growth, the historical multiples, and the community sentiment together. When they agree, conviction. When they disagree, the disagreement is the most informative thing on the page.